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Introduction 
The characteristics of the distribution of security returns, such as skewness, play a 
significant role in financial theory and practice. Many asset pricing models, such as the 
CAPM, assume multivariate normal distributions of stock returns. If stock return 
distributions are skewed, then asset pricing models that account for the presence of higher 
moments should produce more accurate valuations.1 In a study of stock portfolio returns, 
Harvey and Siddique (2000) find that coskewness of portfolio returns with the aggregate 
market returns is a determinant of expected returns.2 Patton (2002) shows that accounting 
for skewness improves performance of optimal asset allocation. Furthermore, accurate 
prediction of the conditional return distribution, especially at the higher moments (volatility 
and skewness), significantly improves the valuation of contingent claims and the 
effectiveness of risk management. Thus, investigating asymmetry in stock return 
distributions and what causes it is important for multiple facets of finance.  
Some theories posit that conditional skewness may be predictable by lagged returns and 
trend-adjusted turnover. At the firm level, there is some empirical evidence of this 
predictability. Harvey and Siddique (2000) document that skewness varies among portfolios 
of different size and book-to-market levels. Chen, Hong, and Stein (2001) report that trend-
adjusted turnover and lagged returns predict skewness of daily returns of individual stocks in 
the U.S. stock market. At the market level, while time variation in skewness has been 
documented, there are no studies of the predictability of skewness.3  
This paper examines whether the conditional skewness of aggregate market returns is 
predictable by lagged returns and trend-adjusted turnover, and we investigate what economic 
mechanisms are responsible for the predictability of skewness. We analyze aggregate market 
returns in 57 countries. We present new evidence that conditional skewness of aggregate 
market returns is predictable. Lagged one-month returns predict conditional skewness of 
daily returns during the following month. This relation between skewness and lagged returns 
                                                 
1 For example, Harvey and Siddique (2000) and Dittmar (2002) develop asset pricing models which include 
higher moments like skewness and kurtosis.  
2 Harvey and Siddique (2000) define coskewness as a measure of the comovement of the second moments of 
the portfolio returns and the second moment of aggregate market returns.  
3 Harvey and Siddique (1999) document time variation in the skewness of the S&P500 index returns and four 
other international market returns. 
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is economically and statistically strong across both developed and emerging countries. We 
find similar results using lagged returns over 3 months, 6 months, and 12 months. In 
contrast, we find that trend-adjusted turnover does not predict market returns.  
Why should conditional skewness be predictable? We categorize the theories that address 
this question into three groups. We discuss them in detail in the next section4. The first 
group of theories shows that more negative skewness should follow stock price declines. 
The earliest theory is the leverage effect (Black, 1976; Christie, 1982). A drop in stock price 
raises financial and operating leverage, which increases volatility of subsequent stock returns. 
An increase in stock price reduces leverage, which reduces volatility of subsequent stock 
returns. This relation between time-varying volatility and returns can generate what appears 
to be non-zero skewness because stock returns measured over an extended period of time 
consist of a mixture of conditional return distributions. When the mean of these conditional 
distributions are declining at the same time as their volatilities are increasing, the return over 
a period of changing conditional distributions will have negative skewness. Consequently, 
the leverage effect can create a negative relation between lagged return and skewness.  
The second theory in this group is the volatility feedback effect (Pindyck, 1984; French et al., 
1987; and Campbell and Hentschel, 1992). Releases of major bad news decrease stock price 
and increase volatility. The increase in volatility increases expected returns, which 
exacerbates the stock price decline. On the other hand, releases of major good news increase 
stock price and also increase volatility; the second effect dampens the former. Thus, given 
the same amount of information, stock price declines are larger than stock price increases. 
This generates a negative relation between lagged return and conditional skewness. The third 
theory is one of fluctuation in the level of uncertainty (David, 1997; Veronesi, 1999). This 
theory is akin to the volatility feedback effect, but it is more specific on how volatility level 
changes with unexpected news.  
The second group of theories predicts more negative skewness following price increases or 
high levels of trend-adjusted turnover. The stochastic bubble model of Blanchard and 
Watson (1982) predicts larger negative skewness following a period of sustained stock price 
                                                 
4 Veronesi (2002) offers a concise but comprehensive review of well know theories that can cause path 
dependent conditional skewness.  
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increase. The asymmetry here is caused by a stock bubble bursting – a low probability of 
very large negative returns. Hong and Stein (2003) propose a model in which lagged trend-
adjusted turnover is negatively related to skewness. This relation arises because investors 
have heterogeneous beliefs and they cannot short sell stocks.  
In the last group is the theory proposed by Cao, Coval, and Hirshleifer (2002) (hereafter 
CCH). Their model is based on information blockage due to trading costs. The model 
predicts negative skewness following a price run up and positive skewness following a price 
run down. CCH also predict increase in volatility following large price changes.  
We adopt a simple, yet effective method to disentangle the effects of these theories. We note 
that the relation between lagged returns and conditional volatility or skewness implied by 
these theories depends on the sign of lagged returns. Therefore, we test the relation between 
lagged returns and conditional skewness based on signed lagged returns. Existing empirical 
studies do not distinguish whether this relation is symmetric with respected to the direction 
of lagged returns.  
Our results are able to distinguish between the competing theories. Specifically, we find that 
stock returns become more negatively skewed following a positive return month and 
become more positively skewed following a negative return month. The result that negative 
lagged returns predict more positive skewness is contrary to the predictions of the leverage 
effect, the volatility feedback effect, and the fluctuation uncertainty theory. The stochastic 
stock bubble model does not predict any relation between negative lagged returns and 
skewness. In contrast, the economic mechanism proposed in CCH appears to be more 
consistent with our findings.  
The findings in this study contribute to the existing literature in various aspects. First, they 
suggest the inclusion of predictable skewness in models of contingent claims and risk 
management. Employing more accurate predictions of conditional skewness should improve 
the valuation of contingent claims on the stock market and the effectiveness of risk 
management. Second, they suggest that future theoretical and empirical models of stock 
market returns should allow for predictable conditional skewness.  Third, the predictability 
of conditional skewness of market returns is relevant to the optimal dynamic asset allocation 
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among stocks, bonds, and other assets, of risk-averse investors. Lastly, the finding that 
positive lagged returns predict more negative skewness and negative lagged returns predict 
more positive skewness suggests that the economic mechanism driving this relation affects 
both buying and selling of stocks. In CCH, trading costs causes the conditional return 
distribution to be asymmetric even when the arrival of information is symmetric ex ante. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section I presents the theories related to 
the predictability of skewness. Section II describes the data employed in our tests. Section III 
reports the test results. We discuss robustness issues in Section IV, and offer concluding 
remarks in Section V. 
I. Background theories 
This section describes existing theories that have implications for conditional skewness. 
Their effects are summarized in Table I.  
A. The leverage effect, volatility feedback effect, and the fluctuation of uncertainty effect 
When a firm has leverage, a drop in stock price raises financial and operating leverage (when 
debt is constant), which increases its volatility. An increase in stock price reduces leverage, 
which reduces its volatility. The leverage effect can generate what appears to be negative 
skewness because the stock return, which is measured over an extended period of time, picks 
up a mixture of conditional return distributions whose mean are declining at the same time 
as their volatilities are increasing. Because leverage is higher after stock prices decline, the 
leverage effect cause a negative relation between lagged return and conditional skewness.  
The volatility feedback effect hinges on the empirical observation that in a period of 
significant news, good or bad, stock prices become more volatile for a period of time. 
Increased volatility increases the expected return on the stock, which further exacerbates a 
stock decline, but dampens a stock price increase. The volatility feedback effect predicts 
larger stock price declines than increases given the same amount of information ex ante. 
This causes returns to be more negatively skewed when stock prices decline. 
Veronesi (1999) proposes a theory in which there is fluctuation in the level of uncertainty of 
the state of the economy. Veronesi (1999) models the dividend process as a Markov 
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switching process between a good and a bad economic state. When investors receive a 
stream of good news, they become more certain that the economy is in the good state. If bad 
news arrives following a stream of good news, it causes a price decline and also makes 
investors more uncertain as to what state the economy is in. On the other hand, the arrival 
of good news when investors believe that the economy is in the bad state, increases price, 
but it also increases the uncertainty about what state the economy is in. Veronesi shows that 
in equilibrium, the willingness of investors to hedge against a change in their own uncertainty 
on the true state of the economy makes stock price overreact to bad news and underreact to 
good news. Consequently, returns are more negatively skewed when prices decline.  
B. Cao, Coval, and Hirshleifer (2002)  
In the Cao, Coval, and Hirshleifer (2002) model there are informed investors, uninformed 
noise traders, and an uninformed market maker. All market participants are fully rational. 
Investors incur heterogeneous trading costs. There is a probability that a set of investors 
received a common noisy informative signal about the valuation of a security.  
The following chain of events illustrates the main idea of this model. There is private good 
news about a security, and a set of investors receive favorable signals about this security. 
Despite receiving a private signal, some investors are “sidelined” and do not trade because of 
high trading costs. Others with lower trading costs buy the security. After observing a stock 
price increase due to buy trades, a favorably informed sidelined investor weighs two effects. 
On the one hand, the accuracy of his signal is confirmed, but on the other hand the stock 
price is more expensive to buy. The price increase may not outweigh the net gain from 
trading because the price is revised by an uninformed market maker. That is, the revised 
price set by the market maker remains less than the full information price; the market maker 
does not know for certain that there is a private signal. Therefore, the market maker places a 
higher probability that the last trade was from a liquidity trader than the informed sidelined 
investor who has received a signal himself. Consequently, more informed investors who 
were previously sidelined buy stocks because the confirmation of their signals by other 
buyers outweighs their trading costs. Overall, significant price rise can trigger trading of a 
favorable informed investor previously sidelined. Conversely, an informed investor with 
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negative information becomes less confident that he has received the correct signal, and 
therefore sits out and does not trade.  
This sidelining of investors causes conditional changes in skewness as a function of past 
returns. After an upward price trend, it is likely that there are a few sidelined investors with 
favorable signals so that prices will rise moderately higher. However, it is likely that there are 
a large number of sidelined investors with adverse signals. The eventual entry of sidelined 
investors with adverse signals will cause a major correction. The market maker is aware of 
these sidelined investors and adjusts prices accordingly when he sees a sell trade. Thus, 
returns become more negatively skewed following price rises, even when returns are ex ante 
symmetric. The opposite chain of events occurs when private news is negative. In this case, 
prices decline and sidelined investors are more likely to be the ones that have favorable 
signals. Thus, returns are more positively skewed following a price decline. This mechanism 
also gives rise to high conditional volatility following either a large price increase or decline.  
C. Hong and Stein (2003)  
Hong and Stein (2003) (hereafter HS) propose a model that generates a relation 
between lagged turnover and skewness. The asymmetric property of returns arises because 
investors have heterogeneous beliefs, and they cannot short sell. In their model, there are 
three traders in the market: investor A, investor B, and arbitrageurs. Investors A and B 
cannot short sell stocks. Arbitrageurs can short sell any amount of stocks at no cost. These 
three traders trade one stock which may be thought of as the market portfolio.  
Investors A and B are assumed to be overconfident and therefore use their private 
information in valuing the stock, but neither use the other’s signal even when it is revealed. 
This assumption keeps the differences of opinion between the two investors from 
converging. Arbitrageurs are fully rational, risk-neutral, and uninformed.  Arbitrageurs realize 
that the best estimate of the stock value is the average of signals of A and B. Sometimes, 
however, the arbitrageurs do not observe the signal of A or B because A or B may not trade 
due to short-sale constraints.  
To see how the model generates asymmetric conditional skewness, consider an example. At 
time 1, investor A receives a pessimistic signal such that A’s valuation is lower than that of 
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B. Investor A sits out of the market since he is not allowed to short sell, but B trades. 
Arbitrageurs observe this and realize that A’s valuation is lower than that of B, but do not 
know by how much. Thus, the stock price at time 1 does not fully reflect information of A.  
At date 2, if B’s signal is positive then B trades with the arbitrageurs, and A does not trade. 
The stock price still does not reflect A’s time 1 information. If however, at time 2, B receives 
a pessimistic signal that is lower than the current market valuation, then B will sell his stocks 
which lowers price. At this point arbitrageurs learn something by observing if and at what 
price A steps in and starts buying. That is, arbitrageurs learn about A’s information by 
observing how A reacts to reduced demand by B. Thus, more information of pessimistic 
investors is revealed as stock price declines. This mechanism generates a higher variance as 
the stock price declines causing negative skewness in stock returns at time 2.  
The logic above, however, is not sufficient to establish that the return distribution over time 
1 and time 2 is negatively skewed. There is a counter effect of positive skewness at time 1 
because the negative draws are the ones hidden from the market at time 1. Hong and Stein  
show that when A’s and B’s beliefs are sufficiently different, time-2 effect dominates leading 
to negative skewness in returns. Hong and Stein suggest that the level of divergence of 
opinion can be measured by turnover. Thus, the model predicts that returns will be more 
negatively skewed following an increase in turnover.  
II. Data 
This section describes the data set employed in the empirical tests which includes 
measures of conditional skewness and conditional volatility, as well as other control 
variables. The daily returns and monthly returns of equity indices, trading volume, and 
market capitalization are obtained from Datastream database for the period of January 1973 
through December 2002 for 23 developed and 34 emerging markets. The results presented 
here are for gross aggregate market returns. We also test aggregate market returns in excess 
of the risk free rate and find the same results. 
A. Market return variables 
The conditional skewness in daily returns, tisk , ,is computed each month as 
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rw, t is the monthly return of the world market index at month t. 
,i tε  is the innovation in monthly return of the stock market index of country i at month t.  
hw, t is the conditional variance of the world index at time t. 
hi,t, is the conditional variance of the monthly return of the stock market index of country i at 
month t. The conditional volatility of monthly returns is the square root of hi,t . 
hi,w, t is the conditional covariance of the monthly returns of the stock market index of 
country i with the monthly return of the world index at time t. 
The weights of the lagged residual vectors of the model in (3) are taken to be 1/2, 1/3, and 
1/6, as in as in Engle, Lilien, and Robins (1987). The constants a2, b2 , and c2 are constrained 
to be identical for every country-world pair. We use the Morgan Stanley Capital International 
Inc. (MSCI) value-weighted world index as proxy for the world market portfolio.5 We 
estimate the model in (3) using the maximum likelihood estimate.  
Turnover is defined as the ratio of volume of dollar trade per month to dollar market 
capitalization at the end of the month. To mitigate the effect of outliers, which occur 
because the denominator is small in some countries, we take the natural logarithm of this 
ratio.  As in Chen, Hong, and Stein (2001), we use trend-adjusted turnover to test the 
predictions of Hong and Stein (2003). The adjustment eliminates any component of 
turnover that is related to a fixed country characteristic. Here, the adjustment is done by 
subtracting from turnover the average of turnover during the previous six months.6   
B. Data on the legality and feasibility of short selling and existence of put options 
We construct a measure of short-sale constraints using survey data on the feasibility 
of short selling and put option trading from Charoenrook and Daouk (2003). Charoenrook 
and Daouk (2003) report survey data on legality and feasibility of short selling and practice 
of put option trading of 111 countries. We use feasibility rather than legality of short selling 
because, as reported in Charoenrook and Daouk (2003), some countries do not have rules 
                                                 
5 The MSCI World Index is actually an index of only developed countries.  It begins in December 1969.  In 
principal, the choice of MSCI All-Country World Index, which includes more countries, may be better. In 
practice, however, since the MSCI All-Country World Index is available only from December 1987, and 
because it has a correlation of 0.9968 with the MSCI World Index, MSCI World Index is a better choice. 
6 Our results are not sensitive to how we adjust for the trend. We adjust turnover using the average turnover 
over a 6 month period, 12 month period, and 18 month period and find the same results.  
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prohibiting short selling and at the same time no short selling takes place because of lack of 
institutional facilities. On the other hand, some countries prohibit short selling, but short 
selling routinely takes place via off-shore markets. 
Columns 2 and 3 of Table II report the feasibility of short selling and put option trading in 
each of the 57 countries in our sample data. The measure of short-sale constraints variable 
SSPO feasibility equals 1 if either short selling or put options trading is feasible, and it equals 0 
otherwise. For example, Chile started put option trading in 1994 and short selling in 2001, 
thus the variable SSPO feasibility for Chile equals 1 in January 1995 and thereafter.  
     [Insert Table II here] 
C. Control Variables 
Bekaert and Harvey (2000) and Henry (2000) empirically show that liberalization has 
an effect on liquidity and volatility. We control for the confounding effects of liberalization 
in all our tests. The indicator variable “liberalization” in Bekaert and Harvey (2000), and 
Henry (2000) changes from zero to one in the month after the official liberalization. Official 
liberalization dates used here are obtained from Table I in Bekaert and Harvey (2000) for 
countries reported. For some of the countries not reported in Bekaert and Harvey (2000), we 
use the liberalization dates from Bae, Bailey and Mao (2003). In addition to liberalization, in 
regression specifications of tests of conditional volatility we include lagged volatility to 
control for autocorrelation in volatility.  
III. Empirical evidence  
We are interested in examining the patterns of conditional skewness in the aggregate 
market returns of the U.S and other international markets and finding out what economic 
mechanisms drive these patterns. We examine both time series regressions of individual 
countries and pooled cross-section and time series panel regressions. All the regressions are 
corrected for autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity in the residual term. All panel 
regressions include a country-fixed-effect dummy, which is not reported. 
A. Predictability of conditional skewness: individual countries 
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Table II presents individual country test results. The unconditional skewness and 
volatility are estimated as in Equations (1) and (2), except that each country’s sample data is 
employed to calculate a single skewness or volatility estimate rather than monthly estimates. 
Like previous studies, we find that the unconditional skewness of the U.S market portfolio is 
negative. Negative skewness is common in developed markets; eighteen out of twenty three 
developed markets have negative skewness. This is not the case in emerging markets; only 
fourteen out of thirty four emerging markets exhibit negative skewness.  
Table II also presents results from regressions of conditional skewness on lagged trend-
adjusted turnover and lagged return, and on lagged return alone, controlling for liberalization 
(not reported). The coefficients that are significant at approximately 10% or lower are 
highlighted. In individual country regressions when the regression coefficients of skewness 
are significant, they are all negative except for 1 regression. Thus, there appears to be a 
negative relation between skewness and lagged returns.  
B. Predictability of conditional skewness: Panel regression analysis 
The summary statistics for the variables employed in the panel regressions are 
presented in Table III. Table IV reports regressions of conditional skewness on lagged 
trend-adjusted turnover and lagged one-month returns, controlling for liberalization and 
fixed-country effects. Lagged trend-adjusted turnover does not predict skewness, but 
lagged return does.  
               [Insert Tables III and IV here] 
Lagged return is negatively related to conditional skewness. The slope estimates of lagged 
returns are between -0.66 to -0.52 in all equation specifications and country groupings. All 
coefficients are statistically significant at lower than the 1% level. The relation of lagged 
returns and skewness is also economically significant. From regression (3), a one standard 
deviation change in lagged return predicts a 0.64 change in skewness of returns, which equals 
85% of the standard deviation in the dispersion of conditional skewness in our sample (0.79 
in Table III).   
     [Insert Table V here] 
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Next we test the relation between skewness and lagged returns conditioned on the sign of 
lagged returns. We sort the sample data by lagged returns into deciles of equal observations. 
We use the daily returns in each decile to compute a single skewness estimate and the 
standard error for the estimate. The skewness is computed using Equation (1). The skewness 
estimates that are more than twice the standard error are highlighted in bold. Results in 
Table V indicate that when lagged returns are negative and become more negative, 
conditional skewness becomes more positive, and when lagged returns are positive and 
become more positive, skewness becomes more negative. The last row of table V reports the 
skewness of decile 10 minus the skewness of decile 1. The difference between the skewness 
of the two deciles is statistically significant at the 5% level. 
     [Insert Table VI here] 
Table VI reports panel regressions of skewness on lagged one month returns, controlling for 
detrended turnover, liberalization, and country-fixed-effects for the sample that includes 
positive and negative lagged returns separately. In the regressions that include only positive 
lagged returns, the coefficient of lagged returns are negative and significant at the 5% level. 
In the regressions that include only negative lagged returns, the coefficient of lagged returns 
are also negative and are all significant at the 1% level.  
These results confirm that the negative relation between skewness and lagged returns are due 
to both negative skewness following a positive return month, and positive skewness 
following a negative return month. These relations are inconsistent with the leverage effect, 
the volatility feedback, and the fluctuation uncertainty model, all of which predicts more 
negative skewness following negative returns. The bubble theory does not predict any 
relation between lagged negative returns and skewness. Among the theories we consider 
here, CCH is the most consistent with the relation found in the test results.  
The difference in the magnitudes of the coefficient estimates of lagged returns in developed 
markets and emerging markets further supports CCH. In CCH, investors are sidelined due 
to trading costs. Since trading costs are higher in emerging markets, we should observe a 
stronger relation between lagged returns and skewness in emerging markets. After a market 
decline, sidelined investors are more likely to have favorable information. When they enter 
the market, they buy stocks. Panel B of Table VI shows that the coefficient estimates of 
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lagged returns in emerging countries are higher than in developed countries. The difference 
is statistically significant at the 5% level.  
After a market run up, sidelined investors are more likely to have adverse information. When 
these investors enter the market, they sell stocks. In countries where short selling is not 
possible, sidelined investors who do not already own stocks, never enter the market even 
when their adverse information is confirmed by observing other sell trades. Table I reports 
that 7 out of 34 emerging countries allow short sales compared to 20 out of 23 developed 
countries. This explains the weaker relation between lagged positive return and conditional 
skewness in emerging countries compared to developed countries even when trading cost is 
higher in emerging markets (reported in Panel B of Table VI).  
C. Conditional volatility and lagged returns 
The empirical evidence on skewness may be interpreted two ways: (1) the leverage effect, the 
volatility feedback effect, and the fluctuation uncertainty are empirically insignificant in our 
data sample, or (2) the empirical impact of these effects is subsumed by other effects in 
predicting skewness. To distinguish between these two interpretations we examine the 
relation between conditional volatility and lagged returns. We examine both the volatility of 
daily returns and volatility of monthly returns of the ARCH model described in Section II. 
[Insert Table VII here] 
Table VII reports panel regressions of conditional volatility on lagged returns, controlling for 
lagged volatility, liberalization, and country-fixed-effects. Panel A reports test results for the 
sample of positive lagged returns, and Panel B reports test results for the sample of negative 
lagged returns. The results in Panels A and B of Table VII show higher volatility follows 
higher lagged returns when lagged returns are negative and when lagged returns are positive. 
We further examine the hypothesis that the regression coefficients of lagged absolute return 
are the same when lagged returns are negative or positive. The t-statistics corresponding to 
the test of this hypothesis is reported in italics in Panel B of Table VII. We find that 
volatility increases more following a stock price decline than a stock price increase, which is 
consistent with the leverage effect, the volatility feedback effect, and the fluctuation 
uncertainty theory. Thus, we conclude that these effects are present in our data, but the 
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relation between skewness and lagged return is subsumed by other economic mechanisms 
such as the CCH model. 
E. Conditional skewness and lagged trend-adjusted turnover 
The HS model predicts a negative relation between lagged trend-adjusted turnover 
and conditional skewness. In the HS model, a regular investor cannot short sell, but 
arbitragers can. The arbitragers need to be able to short sell to absorb the buying demand of 
the regular investors who cannot short sell because one of the simplifying assumptions of 
the model is that the net supply of the stock is zero. When we apply the HS model to our 
empirical setting, we think about arbitragers as a large group of arbitragers who have a large 
inventory of the stock and therefore can buy or sell from their inventory but not actually 
short sell. In other words, the arbitragers would not have to borrow the stocks and sell them, 
but just take them from their inventory and sell them. Moreover, when we classify a market 
as not allowing short selling, in most markets an internal borrowing of securities with a 
financial institution may still be possible. In this sense, the HS model still applies when 
countries prohibit short-selling.  
In HS, the interaction between short-selling constraint of investors and their 
heterogeneous beliefs causes the negative relation between lagged trend-adjusted turnover 
and skewness. To understand the role of short-selling constraints, we estimate the regression 
of conditional skewness on trend-adjusted turnover, an interaction term of lagged trend-
adjusted turnover multiplied by SSPO feasibility, SSPO feasibility, liberalization, and 
country-fixed-effects.  
     [Insert Table VIII here] 
The results reported in Table VIII show that trend-adjusted turnover does not predict the 
skewness of returns. In the all countries sample, the regression coefficient on lagged trend-
adjusted turnover multiplied by SSPO feasibility term is -0.905 and it is significant at the 
10% level. A negative coefficient means that higher trend-adjusted turnover predict more 
negative skewness in countries where short selling is feasible (when SSPO is 1) compared to 
countries where short selling is not feasible. This finding is contrary to our interpretation of 
what HS model predicts. Overall, our test results do not support Hong and Stein (2003).  
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IV. Robustness 
In this section, we review three issues related to our empirical analysis: (1) the 
robustness of the results given different specifications of lagged returns and trend-adjusted 
turnover, (2) measurement error in the skewness estimates, and (3) the effect of outliers.  
Table IX reports regressions of skewness on lagged returns and trend-adjusted turnover for 
different specifications of lagged returns and trend-adjusted turnover. Tests using lagged 
returns constructed using the previous 1 month, 3 months, 6 months, and 12 months are 
reported. Trend-adjusted turnover is constructed by subtracting the trend over the previous 
6 months, 18 months, and 30 months. The results in all regression specifications are 
qualitatively the same as our main results.  
      [Insert Table IX here] 
 The skewness variable is estimated each month from daily returns, thus it is measured with 
noise. In the case that the measurement error is correlated with a regressor, the point 
estimate of the regression coefficient on that regressor is positively biased if the 
measurement error is positively correlated with the regressor. The regression coefficient is 
negatively biased if the measurement error is negatively correlated with the regressor.  
To assess whether our measurement error is related to lagged return, we sort monthly 
skewness estimates by their corresponding lagged returns into 10 deciles, and then calculate 
the standard deviation of monthly skewness in each decile. We then examine if there is any 
detectable relation between the standard deviation number and the average lagged return 
among the deciles. Table X reports the standard deviation and average lagged returns for the 
10 groupings of monthly skewness for the sample that includes all markets, emerging 
markets, and developed markets separately. The results show that there is no relation 
between the standard deviation of monthly skewness estimates and lagged returns, thus 
assuring that the regression coefficient estimates in our analysis are unbiased.  
[Insert Table X here] 
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When measurement error is independent of the regressors in the regression analysis, the 
point estimates of the regression coefficients are unbiased but the standard error estimates 
are inflated. In this case, the regression is tilted against finding significance. We find strong 
statistical significance that lagged return predicts skewness despite measurement error. 
We also examine if our main results are driven by a few outliers. We rank the data based on 
skewness. We eliminated the data points in the highest 2.5 percentile and the data points in 
the lowest 2.5 percentile, and test the relation between lagged positive return and lagged 
negative return with skewness. The results remain statistically significant. 
V. Conclusions   
This paper examines whether conditional skewness of aggregate market returns are 
predictable. Existing theories suggest that skewness may be related to lagged returns and 
lagged trend-adjusted turnover. We find a strong negative relation between conditional 
skewness and lagged returns. We find no relation between skewness and lagged trend-
adjusted turnover.  
This paper further investigates what economic mechanisms drive the relation between lagged 
returns and skewness. A number of theories explain this relation. We note that some of 
these theories differ in their predictions of this relation with respect to the sign of lagged 
returns. They also differ in their predictions of the relation between lagged returns and 
volatility. Thus, to assess the empirical validity of these theories, we examine the relation 
between lagged returns and skewness or volatility conditional on the sign of lagged returns.  
We find that stock returns become more negatively skewed following a positive return 
month and become more positively skewed following a negative return month. The relation 
between lagged returns and skewness is slightly stronger for negative lagged returns. We also 
find that higher volatility follows a large price change in either direction. The increase in 
volatility is higher following a stock price decline than following a price increase.  
Our volatility findings are consistent with the leverage effect, the volatility feedback effect, 
and fluctuation uncertainty effect.  In particular, the leverage effect and the volatility 
feedback effect are so closely tied to fundamental finance theories that it would be surprising 
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if we did not find it in the data. On the other hand, our empirical evidence concerning 
conditional skewness appears to contradict these theories. Our findings indicate that there 
are stronger economic mechanisms which drive the predictability of conditional skewness of 
aggregate market returns. These mechanisms seem to economically dominate the leverage 
effect and the volatility feedback effect. The economic mechanism proposed in CCH 
appears to be the most consistent with all our empirical findings, especially with our findings 
on conditional skewness. 
Our findings have a number of implications for future research. First, since skewness of 
aggregate market returns are predictable, future econometric modeling of aggregate market 
returns should be flexible enough to allow conditional skewness to be affected by lagged 
returns and other variables such as turnover. Second, future theories of the stock return 
generating process should account for the predictability of conditional skewness at a market-
wide level. In particular, they should account for both negative skewness following price 
increases, as well as positive skewness following price declines. This should improve future 
stock market contingent claims valuation models. Lastly, the predictability of conditional 
skewness of market returns is relevant to the optimal asset allocation between stocks, bonds, 
and other assets.  
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Table I: The different effects on conditional volatility and skewness 
 
 
Theory Conditional volatility Conditional skewness 
Leverage  Volatility increases (decline) 
when stock price declines 
(increases) 
Lower or more negatively 
skewed returns follows a stock 
price decline 
Volatility feedback 
And Veronesi (1999) 
Volatility increases with large 
price increase or decrease 
Lower or more negatively 
skewed returns follows a stock 
price decline 
Stock Bubble                         __                        Lower or more negatively 
skewed returns follows a period 
of stock price increase 
Cao Coval and Hirshliefer 
(2002) 
Volatility increases with large 
price increase or decrease 
Lower or more negatively  
(positively) skewed returns 
follows a period of stock price 
increase (decline) 
Hong and Stein (2003)                        __ Lower or more negatively 
skewed returns follows high 
trend-adjusted turnover 
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Table II: Individual countries  
This table reports the feasibility of short selling and put option trading, and properties of the return 
distribution of 57 individual country indices. Columns 3 and 4 report the unconditional skewness and 
unconditional volatility of returns. Unconditional skewness is computed as in Equation (1) employing all 
observations for each country. Unconditional volatility is the standard deviation of daily returns computed 
using all observations for each country. Regression I reports regressions of conditional skewness of daily 
returns on lagged trend-adjusted turnover and lagged one month return. Regression II report regression 
of skewness on lagged one month returns. We control for liberalization in both regressions. “NA” 
denotes not available due to the unavailability of volume data.   
Country Feasibility Existence Unconditional Unconditional
of of put skewness volatility Dep. variable: skewness
short sale options Intercept lagged lagged Intercept lagged 
trend-adjusted return return
turnover
column no. (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Emerging countries
ARGENTINA No 1991 -0.862 0.02129 0.0722 -39.5291 -0.2255 0.0658 -0.3858
(0.3798) (0.0185) (0.7302) (0.4303) (0.5319)
BAHRAIN No No -0.029 0.00611 NA NA NA 0.4175 3.8114
NA NA NA (0.0846) (0.4556)
BRAZIL No 1984 0.141 0.02121 0.1396 -5.7420 -0.8307 0.0538 -1.1881
(0.0608) (0.0000) (0.1824) (0.4722) (0.0128)
CHILE 2001 1994 0.226 0.01189 0.0959 21.7311 -0.8307 0.0893 -0.7416
(0.0443) (0.2197) (0.1709) (0.0642) (0.2316)
CHINA No No 3.136 0.02410 0.0736 -1.0521 -0.8690 0.0765 -0.9456
(0.5039) (0.0723) (0.2309) (0.4973) (0.1883)
COLOMBIA No No 0.322 0.01137 0.0367 25.1970 -0.7501 0.0374 -0.7025
(0.6429) (0.0000) (0.3599) (0.6240) (0.4393)
CZECH Yes No -0.171 0.01370 -0.0073 6.4838 -1.1650 0.0025 -1.0538
(0.9155) (0.2234) (0.1290) (0.9715) (0.1497)
EGYPT No No 0.217 0.01251 NA NA NA 0.0522 -0.7879
NA NA NA (0.6494) (0.5746)
GREECE No 2000 0.395 0.01913 0.2216 -10.9119 -0.2985 0.2234 -0.7571
(0.0009) (0.0547) (0.5706) (0.0010) (0.1760)
HUNGARY No 2000 -0.361 0.02010 0.1424 0.3358 0.0142 0.1447 -0.1810
(0.0391) (0.0033) (0.9826) (0.0347) (0.7898)
INDIA No 2001 0.113 0.01585 0.1613 2.2232 -0.0128 0.1647 0.0867
(0.0139) (0.2475) (0.9783) (0.0127) (0.8629)
INDONESIA No 2004 3.023 0.03183 0.0604 2.1588 -0.4618 0.0803 -0.3254
(0.3755) (0.7137) (0.3682) (0.2457) (0.5330)
ISRAEL No 1995 -0.244 0.01542 0.1723 -28.0166 -0.9249 0.1471 -1.0828
(0.0069) (0.0311) (0.3044) (0.0262) (0.2416)
JORDAN No No -0.139 0.00728 NA NA NA 0.2100 5.7096
NA NA NA (0.1640) (0.1225)
SOUTH KOREA No 1997 0.816 0.02979 0.1385 2.3430 -1.2405 0.1483 -1.0197
(0.0730) (0.1054) (0.0015) (0.0593) (0.0019)
MALAYSIA Started in 2000 -0.091 0.01869 0.1714 -11.5940 -1.4120 0.1719 -1.6057
1996, 
stopped in 
1997
(0.0060) (0.1591) (0.0728) (0.0059) (0.0427)
Regression I
Dep. variable: skewness
Regression II
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Country Feasibility Existence Unconditional Unconditional
of of put skewness volatility Dep. variable: skewness
short sale options Intercept lagged lagged Intercept lagged 
trend-adjusted return return
turnover
column no. (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Emerging countries
MEXICO Yes 2004 -0.220 0.01857 0.0756 -1.5266 -1.0386 0.0749 -0.9594
(0.1988) (0.4366) (0.0202) (0.2077) (0.0224)
MOROCCO No No 0.500 0.00768 NA NA NA 0.1967 -2.8287
NA NA NA (0.0209) (0.1791)
NIGERIA No No 0.200 0.01056 NA NA NA 0.0444 -1.6608
NA NA NA (0.6766) (0.2038)
OMAN No No 1.808 0.00802 NA NA NA -0.1959 -0.0027
NA NA NA (0.5005) (0.9998)
PAKISTAN No No -0.159 0.01985 0.0019 -1.0104 -1.2270 -0.0106 -1.1757
(0.9826) (0.2540) (0.0228) (0.9058) (0.0283)
PERU No No -0.156 0.01128 0.1379 -0.1126 0.2741 0.1380 0.2751
(0.1970) (0.9654) (0.8329) (0.1956) (0.8325)
PHILIPPINES No No 1.133 0.01775 0.1217 -1.5270 -1.1019 0.1648 -0.9183
(0.0646) (0.7099) (0.1046) (0.0160) (0.1596)
POLAND No 2000 0.155 0.02222 0.0924 -8.4099 0.7305 0.1197 0.1453
(0.0851) (0.0264) (0.0986) (0.0256) (0.7465)
RUSSIA Yes 2001 1.406 0.03126 0.1187 11.3679 -0.0589 0.1192 -0.0565
(0.1684) (0.5235) (0.8255) (0.1708) (0.8331)
SAUDI ARABIA No No 0.740 0.00856 NA NA NA 0.1506 -0.4623
NA NA NA (0.4024) (0.8794)
SLOVAKIA No No -0.003 0.01823 NA NA NA -0.1792 1.2243
NA NA NA (0.1381) (0.2333)
SOUTH AFRICA Yes 1992 -0.279 0.01567 0.0430 -1.3011 -0.6612 0.0414 -0.6423
(0.5147) (0.8890) (0.3529) (0.5224) (0.3577)
SRI LANKA No No 5.413 0.01373 NA NA NA 0.1340 0.4771
NA NA NA (0.1714) (0.5343)
TAIWAN 1998 No 0.149 0.02201 0.1880 -1.1897 -0.4656 0.1820 -0.6054
(0.0006) (0.1284) (0.4094) (0.0001) (0.0666)
THAILAND 1998 No 0.556 0.02131 0.2322 -2.8547 -0.8816 0.2302 -0.9868
(0.0000) (0.2590) (0.0563) (0.0000) (0.0279)
TURKEY 1995 No 0.244 0.03419 0.1004 -1.6870 -0.4025 0.0947 -0.4791
(0.1009) (0.3763) (0.2819) (0.1303) (0.1845)
VENEZUELA No No -1.302 0.02731 NA NA NA 0.0997 -0.0453
NA NA NA (0.2341) (0.9440)
ZIMBABWE No No -1.247 0.02121 NA NA NA 0.0934 -0.2077
NA NA NA (0.4510) (0.6941)
Regression I
Dep. variable: skewness
Regression II
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Country Feasibility Existence Unconditional Unconditional
of of put skewness volatility Dep. variable: skewness
short sale options Intercept lagged lagged Intercept lagged 
trend-adjusted return return
turnover
column no. (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Developed contries
AUSTRALIA Yes 1982 -1.394 0.01266 0.0060 2.6089 -1.0386 0.0445 -0.4387
(0.8853) (0.6630) (0.0445) (0.2206) (0.2772)
AUSTRIA Yes 1991 0.104 0.01011 -0.0750 1.1145 0.4411 -0.0203 0.3407
(0.1066) (0.7348) (0.4041) (0.6673) (0.5854)
BELGIUM Yes 1993 -0.073 0.01038 0.0702 12.7301 -1.4014 0.0749 -1.0343
(0.1287) (0.2744) (0.1032) (0.0349) (0.1568)
CANADA Yes 1975 -0.611 0.00910 -0.0319 -5.6716 -0.6312 -0.0361 -0.5535
(0.4004) (0.1146) (0.2512) (0.3342) (0.3100)
DENMARK Yes 1990 0.613 0.01173 0.0420 -0.5392 0.0355 0.0377 1.5853
(0.4216) (0.9477) (0.9666) (0.7058) (0.2399)
FINLAND No 1988 -0.088 0.03150 -0.0345 9.9433 -0.1259 0.0100 -0.3529
(0.7457) (0.2193) (0.8534) (0.9192) (0.5184)
FRANCE Yes 1987 -0.185 0.01245 -0.0128 1.5505 -0.0164 0.0013 -0.0399
(0.7807) (0.8125) (0.9812) (0.9698) (0.9167)
GERMANY Yes 1990 -0.247 0.01125 -0.0194 -2.0487 -0.7704 -0.0048 -0.9714
(0.6693) (0.0135) (0.1958) (0.8766) (0.0633)
HONG KONG 1994 1993 -0.966 0.01896 0.0863 -4.7414 -1.2816 0.0622 -1.0617
(0.1373) (0.4203) (0.1005) (0.1194) (0.0022)
IRELAND Yes No -0.053 0.01202 -0.1511 -0.9651 -0.1314 0.0214 -0.5095
(0.3872) (0.8971) (0.9214) (0.6757) (0.6072)
ITALY Yes 1995 -0.133 0.01466 0.0558 1.5145 0.6535 0.0809 0.0949
(0.1397) (0.5472) (0.2340) (0.0107) (0.8017)
JAPAN Yes 1989 0.090 0.01242 0.1358 0.5308 -0.5770 0.1627 -1.0302
(0.0053) (0.5651) (0.3753) (0.0000) (0.0586)
LUXEMBURG 1991 No 0.304 0.01028 0.1151 90.7614 0.3593 0.0820 1.3863
(0.4023) (0.1194) (0.7817) (0.3103) (0.2279)
NETHERLANDS Yes 1978 -0.188 0.01071 0.0176 -1.8128 -0.8299 0.0399 -0.2005
(0.6250) (0.3081) (0.2215) (0.1880) (0.7149)
NEW ZEALAND No No 0.016 0.01303 0.0736 4.1875 -0.8917 0.0563 -0.2637
(0.1620) (0.4432) (0.1199) (0.2261) (0.6791)
NORWAY 1999 1990 -0.429 0.01467 0.0915 -3.1910 -1.0445 0.0932 -1.1088
(0.0309) (0.2275) (0.0209) (0.0289) (0.0145)
PORTUGAL Yes 1999 -0.024 0.01074 0.0811 -5.3465 0.4861 0.0833 0.2083
(0.1421) (0.2892) (0.5704) (0.1299) (0.7948)
SINGAPORE Yes 1993 -0.161 0.01490 0.1517 -1.7909 -0.6233 0.1885 -0.7018
(0.0020) (0.7744) (0.2361) (0.0000) (0.0657)
SPAIN No 1992 -0.189 0.01261 -0.0431 -6.5796 -0.1413 -0.0495 -0.8374
(0.4565) (0.1064) (0.8571) (0.3183) (0.2793)
SWEDEN 1991 1987 -0.156 0.01477 0.0700 4.8440 -1.1275 0.0669 -1.0984
(0.1167) (0.0943) (0.0807) (0.1380) (0.0843)
SWITZERLAND Yes 1988 -0.301 0.01042 0.0138 5.5211 -1.6765 0.0454 -0.6515
(0.7624) (0.3622) (0.0378) (0.1634) (0.2094)
UK Yes 1984 -0.112 0.01186 -0.0589 1.0791 -0.9276 -0.0246 -0.7070
(0.2009) (0.7569) (0.1771) (0.4448) (0.1091)
US Yes 1973 -0.834 0.00998 0.0620 0.1397 -1.4161 0.0616 -1.4335
(0.1071) (0.9599) (0.0495) (0.1022) (0.0469)
Regression I
Dep. variable: skewness
Regression II
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Table III: Summary statistics 
 
This table presents summary statistics for variables employed in the regressions. Skewness is the 
conditional skewness calculated as in Equation (1) using daily market returns for each month. Turnover is 
the logarithm of the ratio of volume of dollar trade per month to dollar market capitalization at the end of 
the month. Trend-adjusted turnover is turnover minus the average of turnover during the previous six 
months. SSPO feasibility is a binary variable that equals one if either short-selling or put option trading is 
feasible in that country during that month (in practice). The indicator variable liberalization changes from 
zero to one in the month after the official liberalization date, which was obtained from Bekaert and 
Harvey (2000). Volatility is the standard deviation of daily return during a month.  
 
 
Variable name Mean Standard 
deviation 
Maximum Minimum 
Skewness 0.0662 0.7918 4.6471 -4.5862 
Lagged trend-adjusted 
turnover 
-0.0081 0.5298 16.5629 -12.6573 
SSPO feasibility 0.4279 0.4948 1.0000 0.0000 
Monthly Return 0.0076 0.0950 1.0229 -1.2114 
Liberalization 0.5816 0.4933 1.0000 0.0000 
Volatility 0.0170 0.0243 0.4467 0.0019 
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Table IV: Conditional skewness  
 
This table reports panel regressions of conditional skewness of daily returns on lagged trend-adjusted turnover, lagged one-month returns, controlling for 
lagged skewness, lagged volatility, liberalization, and a country-fixed-effect dummy (not reported). Turnover is the logarithm of the ratio of volume of dollar 
trade per month to dollar market capitalization at the end of the month. Trend-adjusted turnover is turnover minus the average of turnover during the previous 
six months. Lagged return is the index return during the previous month. Lagged skewness is the skewness during the previous month. Lagged volatility is the 
standard deviation of daily returns during the previous month. The indicator variable liberalization changes from zero to one in the month after the official 
liberalization date, which was obtained from Bekaert and Harvey (2000). All regression coefficient estimates are corrected for autocorrelation and 
heteroskedasticity in the residual term. P-value is reported in parenthesis.  
 
 
 
   
  All countries Developed countries  Emerging countries 
Regression 
specification 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4)  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Independent 
variables   
 
 
 
  
   
   
 
Lagged 
trend-
adjusted 
turnover  
0.1440 
(0.2651)  
0.1517 
(0.2217)
0.1433 
(0.2631)
-0.8296 
(0.2038)  
-0.8407 
(0.1922)
-1.0574 
(0.0966) 
 
0.1642 
(0.1885)  
0.1723 
(0.1517)
0.1661 
(0.1774)
Lagged 
return   
-0.5611 
(0.0000) 
-0.6393 
(0.0000)
-0.6602 
(0.0000)  
-0.5283 
(0.0000)
-0.6345 
(0.0000)
-0.6063 
(0.0001) 
 
 
-0.5837 
(0.0000)
-0.6421 
(0.0000)
-0.6638 
(0.0000)
Lagged 
skewness     
0.0277 
(0.0369)    
0.0306 
(0.0516) 
 
   
0.0025 
(0.2650)
Lagged 
volatility     
1.4656 
(0.0384)    
3.7039 
(0.0664) 
 
   
1.2942 
(0.0857)
Liberalization 
 
0.0078 
(0.7240) 
0.0046 
(0.8293) 
0.0027 
(0.9021)
0.0033 
(0.8804)
-0.0072 
(0.9155)
0.0020 
(0.9705)
-0.0113 
(0.8675)
-0.0147 
(0.8240) 
 0.0089 
(0.7020)
0.0047 
(0.8370)
0.0037 
(0.8734)
0.0042 
(0.8549)
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Table V: The relation between lagged return and skewness  
 
We sort the sample data according to lagged returns into deciles of equal number of observations. We use 
the daily returns in each decile to compute a skewness estimate and the standard error for each estimate. 
The skewness is computed using Equation (1). The corresponding standard error = n/6   , where n is 
the number of observations. The conditional skewness estimate that is more than twice the standard error 
is highlighted in bold.  
 
 
   
 Developed countries Emerging countries 
       
Decile Lagged 
return 
Conditional 
skewness 
Standard error  Lagged 
return 
Conditional 
skewness 
Standard error  
       
1 -0.1119 0.0184 0.0199 -0.1780 0.7697 0.0263 
       
2 -0.0509 0.0298 0.0199 -0.0833 0.7914 0.0263 
       
3 -0.0272 -1.0638 0.0199 -0.0494 -0.2112 0.0263 
       
4 -0.0101 -0.1539 0.0199 -0.0258 0.0259 0.0263 
       
5 0.0036 -0.0585 0.0199 -0.0048 -0.3244 0.0263 
       
6 0.01744 -0.64922 0.0199 0.0157 1.62218 0.0263 
       
7 0.03094 -0.80443 0.0199 0.0369 0.87641 0.0263 
       
8 0.04708 -0.87794 0.0199 0.0620 1.06610 0.0263 
       
9 0.07056 -0.15976 0.0199 0.0998 -0.01106 0.0263 
       
10 0.13288 -0.77211 0.0199 0.2253 -0.75586 0.0263 
       
10-1 0.24478 -0.79051 0.0199 0.4033 -1.52556 0.0263 
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Table VI: Conditional skewness and lagged returns 
 
This table reports panel regressions of conditional skewness of daily returns on lagged trend-adjusted 
turnover, lagged one-month returns, controlling for liberalization, and a country-fixed-effect dummy (not 
reported). Turnover is the logarithm of the ratio of volume of dollar trade per month to dollar market 
capitalization at the end of the month. Trend-adjusted turnover is turnover subtracted by the average of 
turnover during the previous six months. Lagged return is the index return during the previous month. 
The indicator variable liberalization changes from zero to one in the month after the official liberalization 
date, which was obtained from Bekaert and Harvey (2000). All regression coefficient estimates are 
corrected for autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity in the residual term. P-value is reported in 
parenthesis. Panels A and B report regressions that employ data when lagged returns are positive and 
negative, respectively. 
 
 
 
Panel A: Data sample includes only positive lagged returns 
 
  All countries  Developed countries Emerging countries 
Regression 
specification 
 (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) 
Independent 
variables    
 
  
 
  
 
Lagged trend-
adjusted 
turnover  
-0.2426 
(0.3847)  
-0.1756 
(0.5207)
 
-0.2258 
(0.7820)  
0.1160 
(0.8900)
-0.2450 
(0.4005)  
-0.2087 
(0.4725)
Lagged return 
  
-0.3591 
(0.0163) 
-0.3840 
(0.0318)  
-0.4439 
(0.0138)
-0.6568 
(0.0059)  
-0.2746 
(0.2513) 
-0.1985 
(0.4320)
Liberalization 
 
-0.0828 
(0.0073) 
-0.0276 
(0.3830) 
-0.0415 
(0.2301)
 -0.1093 
(0.2307)
-0.0411 
(0.5890)
-0.0341 
(0.7206)
-0.0804 
(0.0138) 
-0.0337 
(0.3711) 
-0.0590 
(0.1375)
 
 
 
Panel B: Data sample includes only negative lagged returns 
 
 
  All countries  Developed countries Emerging countries 
Regression 
specification 
 (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) 
Independent 
variables    
 
  
 
  
 
Lagged trend-
adjusted 
turnover  
0.2153 
(0.0591)  
0.2082 
(0.0763)
 
-1.5964 
(0.0999)  
-1.9219 
(0.0402)
0.2411 
(0.0317)  
0.2383 
(0.0382)
Lagged return 
  
-0.6723 
(0.0000) 
-0.7296 
(0.0000)  
-0.5763 
(0.0009)
-0.6421 
(0.0016)  
-0.7830 
(0.0001) 
-0.8440 
(0.0002)
Liberalization 
 
0.0993 
(0.0014) 
0.0027 
(0.9361) 
0.0033 
(0.9307)
 0.1118 
(0.2487)
0.0473 
(0.5521)
0.0194 
(0.8482)
0.0977 
(0.0029) 
-0.0144 
(0.7258) 
-0.0131 
(0.7740)
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Table VII: Conditional volatility 
 
This table reports panel regressions of conditional volatility of daily returns and monthly returns on lagged 
one-month absolute returns, controlling for lagged volatility, liberalization, and a country-fixed-effect 
dummy (not reported). Volatility of daily returns is calculated as the standard deviation of daily return 
using daily return observations in each month. The volatility of monthly returns is calculated from a 
multivariate ARCH model in Equation (3). Lagged return is the index return during the previous month. 
The indicator variable liberalization changes from zero to one in the month after the official liberalization 
date, which was obtained from Bekaert and Harvey (2000). All regression coefficient estimates are 
corrected for autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity in the residual term. P-value is reported in 
parenthesis. Panels A and B report regressions that employ data when lagged returns are positive and 
negative, respectively. Panel B also reports the t-statistics (in italics) for the test of the hypothesis that the 
coefficients of absolute lagged returns are equal when lagged returns are negative and when lagged returns 
are positive.  
 
Panel A: Data sample includes only positive lagged returns 
  All countries  Developed countries Emerging countries 
Dependent 
variable 
 Volatility 
of Daily 
returns 
Volatility of 
monthly  
returns 
 Volatility 
of Daily 
returns 
Volatility of 
monthly  
returns 
Volatility 
of Daily 
returns 
Volatility of 
monthly  
returns 
Independent 
variables    
 
    
Lagged 
absolute return  
0.0218 
(0.0000) 
0.1952 
(0.0000) 
 
0.0151 
(0.0000) 
0.1109 
(0.0000) 
0.0255 
(0.0010) 
0.2260 
(0.0000) 
Lagged 
volatility  
0.3513 
(0.0000) 
0.0683 
(0.0004) 
 
0.4155 
(0.0000) 
0.0580 
(0.0160) 
0.3396 
(0.0000) 
0.0599 
(0.0020) 
Liberalization 
 
-0.0016 
(0.0025) 
-0.0009 
(0.0180) 
 0.0004 
(0.3192) 
-0.0005 
(0.0549) 
-0.0019 
(0.0018) 
-0.0007 
(0.1236) 
  
 
 
 
Panel B: Data sample includes only negative lagged returns 
  All countries  Developed countries Emerging countries 
Dependent 
variable 
 Volatility 
of Daily 
returns 
Volatility of 
monthly  
returns 
 Volatility 
of Daily 
returns 
Volatility of 
monthly  
returns 
Volatility 
of Daily 
returns 
Volatility of 
monthly  
returns 
Independent 
variables    
 
    
Lagged 
absolute return 
 
0.0405 
(0.0000) 
3.82 
0.2099 
(0.0000) 
1.95 
 0.0203 
(0.0000) 
2.55 
0.1414 
(0.0000) 
3.39 
0.0562 
(0.0000) 
3.54 
0.2334 
(0.0000) 
1.14 
Lagged 
volatility  
0.4481 
(0.0000) 
0.1343 
(0.0008) 
 
0.3862 
(0.0000) 
0.0815 
(0.1232) 
0.4438 
(0.0000) 
0.1278 
(0.0021) 
Liberalization 
 
0.0006 
(0.3832) 
0.0009 
(0.0630) 
 0.0017 
(0.0013) 
0.0001 
(0.9219) 
0.0005 
(0.4400) 
0.0011 
(0.0425) 
 
 
 29
 
Table VIII: Conditional skewness and short-sale constraints 
 
This table reports panel regressions of conditional skewness of daily returns on SSPO feasibility, lagged 
trend-adjusted turnover, lagged one-month returns, the interaction term SSPO feasibility × trend-adjusted 
turnover, controlling for liberalization, and a country-fixed-effect dummy (not reported). SSPO feasibility 
is a measure of short-sale constraints. SSPO feasibility is a binary variable that equals one if either short-
selling or put option trading is possible in that country during that month (in practice). Turnover is the 
logarithm of the ratio of volume of dollar trade per month to dollar market capitalization at the end of the 
month. Trend-adjusted turnover is turnover minus the average of turnover during the previous six 
months. Lagged return is the index return during the previous month. The indicator variable liberalization 
changes from zero to one in the month after the official liberalization date, which was obtained from 
Bekaert and Harvey (2000). All regression coefficient estimates are corrected for autocorrelation and 
heteroskedasticity in the residual term. P-value is reported in parenthesis.  
 
 
 
 All 
countries 
Developed 
countries 
Emerging 
countries 
Independent variables       
SSPO feasibility 0.0293 
(0.2919)  
-0.0126 
(0.7549)  
0.0642 
(0.0935)  
Lagged trend-adjusted turnover 0.1772 
(0.1491)  
-4.5237 
(0.2907)  
0.1852 
(0.1262)  
SSPO feasibility × Lagged trend-adjusted 
turnover 
-0.9052 
(0.0900)  
3.8994 
(0.3681)  
-1.0405 
(0.2208)  
Liberalization -0.0001 
(0.9967)  
-0.0049 
(0.9430)  
-0.0085 
(0.7517)  
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Table IX: Conditional skewness and different specification for lagged returns and trend-adjusted 
turnover 
 
This table reports panel regressions of conditional skewness of daily returns on lagged trend-adjusted 
turnover, lagged returns, controlling for liberalization, and a country-fixed-effect dummy (not reported). 
Turnover is the logarithm of the ratio of volume of dollar trade per month to dollar market capitalization 
at the end of the month. The indicator variable liberalization changes from zero to one in the month after 
the official liberalization date, which was obtained from Bekaert and Harvey (2000). The 6 regression 
specifications differ in how the trend-adjusted turnover and lagged return variables were constructed. For 
regression (1), trend-adjusted turnover is turnover minus the average of turnover during the previous six 
months. Lagged return is the index return during the previous month. For regression (2), trend-adjusted 
turnover is turnover minus the average of turnover during the previous six months. Lagged return is the 
index return during the previous 3 months. For regression (3), trend-adjusted turnover is turnover minus 
the average of turnover during the previous six months. Lagged return is the index return during the 
previous 6 months. For regression (4), trend-adjusted turnover is turnover minus the average of turnover 
during the previous six months. Lagged return is the index return during the previous 12 months. For 
regression (5), trend-adjusted turnover is turnover minus the average of turnover during the previous 18 
months. Lagged return is the index return during the previous month. For regression (6), trend-adjusted 
turnover is turnover subtracted the average of turnover during the previous 30 months. Lagged return is 
the index return during the previous month. All regression coefficient estimates are corrected for 
autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity in the residual term. P-value is reported in parenthesis. 
 
 
Panel A 
Regression specification  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Independent variables  Conditional skewness 
Lagged return 
 
-0.5611 
(0.0000) 
-1.0668 
(0.0000)
-1.2708 
(0.0000)
-1.7657 
(0.0000)
-0.5611 
(0.0000)
-0.5611 
(0.0000)
Liberalization 
 
0.0046 
(0.8293) 
0.0010 
(0.9644)
-0.0009 
(0.9669)
-0.0049 
(0.8174)
0.0046 
(0.8293)
0.0046 
(0.8293)
 
Panel B 
Regression specification  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Independent variables  Conditional skewness 
Lagged trend-adjusted turnover 
 
0.1517 
(0.2217)
0.1755 
(0.1381)
0.1643 
(0.1804)
0.1483 
(0.2400)
0.0474 
(0.3536)
0.0272 
(0.4252) 
Lagged return 
 
-0.6393 
(0.0000)
-1.2816 
(0.0000)
-1.5989 
(0.0000)
-2.4095 
(0.0000)
-0.6387 
(0.0000)
-0.6387 
(0.0000) 
Liberalization 
 
0.0027 
(0.9021)
-0.0044 
(0.8448)
-0.0075 
(0.7371)
-0.0151 
(0.4957)
0.0042 
(0.8494)
0.0047 
(0.5666) 
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Table X: The variation in monthly skewness measure and lagged returns 
 
We calculate a monthly skewness in Equation (1) using daily returns. We then sort this data into deciles of 
equal number of observations based on lagged returns. We calculate the variation in the monthly 
skewness estimate for each decile as the standard deviation of the monthly skewness estimate in each 
decile. This table reports the average lagged returns and standard deviation of the monthly skewness 
estimate for each decile for the sample of all countries, developed countries, and emerging countries 
respectively.  
 
 
 
    
 All countries Developed countries Emerging countries 
Decile Average 
lagged 
return 
Standard 
deviation of 
skewness 
estimates 
Average 
lagged 
return 
Standard 
deviation of 
skewness 
estimates 
Average 
lagged 
return 
Standard 
deviation of 
skewness 
estimates 
1 -0.1397 0.7807 -0.1119 0.7362 -0.1779 0.7706 
       
2 -0.0617 0.7780 -0.0508 0.7521 -0.0831 0.8174 
       
3 -0.0343 0.7503 -0.0271 0.6951 -0.0493 0.8159 
       
4 - 0.0147 0.7964 -0.0101 0.7436 -0.0257 0.9225 
       
5 0.0013 0.8032   0.0036 0.7307 -0.0047 0.9437 
       
6 0.0170 0.8044 0.0175 0.7767 0.0158 0.8849 
       
7 0.0327 0.7516 0.0310 0.7493 0.0370 0.8375 
       
8 0.0516 0.8032 0.0472 0.7416 0.0621 0.8500 
       
9 0.0794 0.8163 0.0708 0.7923 0.0999 0.8839 
       
10 0.1706 0.7803 0.1335 0.7113 0.2258 0.8388 
 

